Strategic design of competing supply chain networks with foresight Article

Rezapour, S, Farahani, RZ, Ghodsipour, SH et al. (2011). Strategic design of competing supply chain networks with foresight . ADVANCES IN ENGINEERING SOFTWARE, 42(4), 130-141. 10.1016/j.advengsoft.2010.12.004

cited authors

  • Rezapour, S; Farahani, RZ; Ghodsipour, SH; Abdollahzadeh, S

authors

abstract

  • We consider models for duopolistic competitive supply chain network designing with sequential acting and variable delivered prices. These models design a multi-tier chain operating in markets under deterministic price-depended demands and with a rival chain present. The existing rival chain tends to open some new retailers to recapture some income in a near future. These rival chains' structures are assumed to be set "once and for all" in a sequential manner but further price adjustments are possible. This problem is modeled for each of the following two strategies: (1) the von Stackelberg strategy in which we assume the existing chain will choose its future entry sites in the way to optimize its market share. This problem is modeled by a linear binary bi-level program and solved by a combinatorial meta-heuristic. (2) the minimum regret strategy in which we assume the existing chain's future entry sites are totally unpredic, it is playing a "game against nature". This problem is modeled by linear binary programs. © 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

publication date

  • January 1, 2011

published in

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

start page

  • 130

end page

  • 141

volume

  • 42

issue

  • 4