Strategic allocation of water conservation incentives to balance environmental flows and societal outcomes Article

Zamani Sabzi, H, Rezapour, S, Fovargue, R et al. (2019). Strategic allocation of water conservation incentives to balance environmental flows and societal outcomes . ECOLOGICAL ENGINEERING, 127 160-169. 10.1016/j.ecoleng.2018.11.005

cited authors

  • Zamani Sabzi, H; Rezapour, S; Fovargue, R; Moreno, H; Neeson, TM

abstract

  • Societies around the world face difficult choices in allocating fresh water between human uses and environmental flows for freshwater ecosystems. In many regions, policy makers are developing water conservation plans that set ambitious targets for reduced water consumption. These plans often rely on incentives, rather than regulation, to achieve water savings. However, water managers and conservation groups lack guidance on the most cost-effective locations and times for incentivizing water conservation. Here, we develop a spatial planning framework that enables conservation practitioners to strategically allocate incentives for water conservation actions to balance ecosystem and societal needs for water. We apply this model to the Red River (USA) and draw three main conclusions. First, even optimal allocation of water across the network cannot simultaneously meet societal and environmental flow targets given current water availability and societal usage. Second, modest reductions in societal water usage (e.g., 1–3%) can significantly reduce water conflicts in the basin, but only when these water conservation actions are strategically allocated in time and space. Third, however, substantial reduction in societal water usage (>21%) is needed to fully satisfy societal and environmental flow goals. We discuss future research directions in the Red River and the transferability of our results to other drought-prone river networks worldwide.

publication date

  • February 1, 2019

published in

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

start page

  • 160

end page

  • 169

volume

  • 127