Information-Based Stock Trading, Executive Incentives, and the Principal-Agent Problem Article

Kang, Qiang, Liu, Qiao. (2010). Information-Based Stock Trading, Executive Incentives, and the Principal-Agent Problem . MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 56(4), 682-698. 10.1287/mnsc.1090.1128

International Collaboration

cited authors

  • Kang, Qiang; Liu, Qiao

authors

publication date

  • April 1, 2010

published in

keywords

  • Business & Economics
  • COMPENSATION
  • EQUITY GRANTS
  • LIQUIDITY
  • MARKET-EFFICIENCY
  • Management
  • OPTIONS
  • Operations Research & Management Science
  • PERFORMANCE PAY
  • RISK
  • SENSITIVITY
  • Science & Technology
  • Social Sciences
  • Technology
  • adjusted pin
  • calibration
  • endogenous information-based trading
  • pay-performance sensitivity
  • risk-incentive trade-off

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

publisher

  • INFORMS

start page

  • 682

end page

  • 698

volume

  • 56

issue

  • 4