Reducing incremental costs associated with the delegation of incentive contracting decisions: An analysis of planning and control decisions in a manufacturing setting in the presence of moral hazard Article

Natarajan, R, Sethuraman, K, Surysekar, K. (2005). Reducing incremental costs associated with the delegation of incentive contracting decisions: An analysis of planning and control decisions in a manufacturing setting in the presence of moral hazard . EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH, 162(3), 816-838. 10.1016/j.ejor.2003.09.015

International Collaboration

keywords

  • Business & Economics
  • CONTROL-SYSTEMS
  • Management
  • Operations Research & Management Science
  • PERFORMANCE
  • Science & Technology
  • Social Sciences
  • Technology
  • UNITS
  • agency theory
  • decision analysis
  • heuristics
  • organization theory

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

publisher

  • ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV

start page

  • 816

end page

  • 838

volume

  • 162

issue

  • 3