Co-opted boards and anti-takeover provisions in US firms: Do better financial outcomes and dynamic governance matter? Article

Miah, Mohammad Dulal, Hasan, Rashedul, Mollah, Sabur et al. (2026). Co-opted boards and anti-takeover provisions in US firms: Do better financial outcomes and dynamic governance matter? . Journal of Corporate Finance, 101 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2026.103064

cited authors

  • Miah, Mohammad Dulal; Hasan, Rashedul; Mollah, Sabur; Upadhyay, Arun

authors

publication date

  • September 1, 2026

published in

keywords

  • AGENCY
  • Agency theory
  • Board of directors
  • Business & Economics
  • Business, Finance
  • COMPENSATION
  • CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
  • Corporate governance
  • DETERMINANTS
  • Firm performance
  • INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS
  • LIFE
  • Market for corporate control
  • PAY
  • PERFORMANCE
  • Social Sciences
  • TAKEOVERS

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

publisher

  • ELSEVIER

volume

  • 101