When do bureaucrats choose to unburden clients: A randomized experiment Article

Johnson, Donavon, Neshkova, Milena. (2024). When do bureaucrats choose to unburden clients: A randomized experiment . PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, 102(3), 1210-1232. 10.1111/padm.12972

cited authors

  • Johnson, Donavon; Neshkova, Milena

publication date

  • September 1, 2024

published in

keywords

  • ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN
  • EQUITY
  • GOVERNMENT
  • Government & Law
  • POLITICAL CONTROL
  • Political Science
  • Public Administration
  • REPRESENTATION
  • SOCIAL-JUSTICE INTEREST
  • STATE
  • STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRATS
  • Social Sciences
  • VULNERABILITY
  • WELFARE

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

publisher

  • WILEY

start page

  • 1210

end page

  • 1232

volume

  • 102

issue

  • 3