A note on the interaction effects of non-financial measures of performance

A note on the interaction effects of non-financial measures of performance Article

Surysekar, K. (2003). A note on the interaction effects of non-financial measures of performance . 14(4), 409-417. 10.1016/j.mar.2003.08.002

Using principal-agent analyses, the effect of the interactions between two non-financial measures of performance in an agent's incentive compensation scheme is studied. The agent can allocate effort between "meeting output targets" and "getting output that needs no rework." The principal trades off (1) a penalty for not meeting output targets, and (2) cost of reworking output that is defective when initially produced. In a compensation mechanism that includes incentives based on measures of output that needs no rework, as well as total output, it is shown that the agent may respond to an increased weight on output that needs no rework by reducing effort allocated towards it. This occurs when the increased weight on the output that needs no rework is accompanied by a sufficiently steep decrease in the weight on total output in the compensation mechanism, leading to a reduction of all effort, and all output. Numerical analyses and implications for the use of multiple measures of performance-based incentives are provided. © 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.